Emissions taxes and carbon caps can both lead to e cient production of energy, in the sense of controlling carbon emissions to the extent that is e cient with existing technologies. However, the regulatory policy has a second objective, which is to create incentives to develop lower-carbon technologies. With both objectives in mind, does one policy dominate the other? I address this question in a model of technology switching. I show (under mild conditions) that, for both policies, the innovator's licensing revenue is a given fraction of gross pro t in the energy market, where the fraction is the innovator's reduction in the emissions rate. This implies that the emissions tax is more lucrative for the innovator than a carbon cap when the regulatory policies are xed and initially equivalent, that an adjustment for e ciency increases licensing revenue in the capand-trade regime, but reduces licensing revenue in the taxation regime, and that the two regulatory policies are equally lucrative when they would be adjusted after the innovation for static e ciency.
Introduction
Carbon emissions are an important byproduct of producing energy, and it is widely accepted that they contribute to global warming. Managing this problem will require carbon-reducing technologies that are not yet available. This raises the question of how regulation can best create incentives to innovate.
Any regulatory mechanism that makes it expensive to emit carbon will encourage the development of lower-carbon technologies. Tradeable carbon allowances have that e ect, as do emissions taxes. However, these regulatory instruments are not equivalent, and environmental economists have long been interested in the question of which is superior.
Two types of innovation have been addressed in the economics literature. One concerns abatement technologies (Milliman and Prince (1989) , Jung, Krutilla and Boyd (1996) , Parry (1995 Parry ( ,2003 and Fischer, Parry and Pizer (2003) ), and the other concerns replacement technologies (Denicolo (1999) ). For example, gasoline-powered automobiles might eventually be replaced by those with a ordable hydrogen combustion. Electricity might eventually be produced with solar power rather than coal. These improvements do not require retro tting or \abating," but instead require that producers switch to the lower-carbon technology.
I will discuss replacement technologies, since those seem most germane to the problem of global warming. My objective is to synthesize what is known from the two literatures, adding modestly to the conclusions, and giving a di erent lens through which to interpret them.
Regardless of which type of regulation is chosen, an emissions tax or a carbon cap, the policy must perform two tasks. One task is to encourage innovation. The other task is to ensure \static e ciency", given the best technology available.
Static e ciency has two aspects, which we might call \productive" e ciency and \con-sumption" e ciency. Productive e ciency means that energy is produced at the cheapest social and private cost. It requires that the social and private cost of producing energy is the same at the margin for each producer, possibly accounting for e cient abatement measures. When a cleaner replacement technology becomes available, productive e ciency requires that eventually every producer switches to it.
Supposing that production e ciency is achieved, consumption e ciency requires that the price of energy is equal to the marginal cost of producing it. Marginal cost must include the social cost of emissions. Unless the replacement technology achieves zero emissions, energy supply should still be lower than the supply where price equals the private marginal cost of producing it. One of the main questions is whether consumption e ciency and incentives to innovate are in con ict, as they are for other innovations.
Because a carbon-reducing innovation reduces the social cost of emissions, it is intuitive that the new technology should lead to an expansion in energy consumption. But what should happen to total emissions? An expansion in energy production can increase emissions even though the emissions rate is lower. I show below that a decrease in emissions is optimal if energy production is in the elastic portion of the demand curve, but not necessarily otherwise.
Because the production of energy and emissions should adjust when a new technology is available, the regulatory policy should be adjusted. Denicolo (1999) focusses on such adjustments, and shows that if innovators anticipate an e ciency adjustment of either type, the incentives to innovate are the same under both policies. The argument is reprised below. Fischer, Parry and Pizer (2003) argue that this is also true for abatement technologies.
However, there are many reasons that the regulatory policy might not adjust. Parry (1995) argues (and Denicolo agrees) that the emissions tax must fall if the new technology is proprietary. Otherwise, the emissions tax and royalty together will cause the price of energy to be ine ciently high. The argument is persuasive, but it could be hard to implement. The regulator would have to anticipate the royalty when choosing the emissions tax. That would require complicated legislation. As to carbon caps, they are probably easier to adjust upwards than downwards. Because either adjustment might be required, it is again not clear how the underlying legislation should be drafted.
I reprise these arguments below, but, like Fischer et al (2003) , I mostly focus on policies that are e cient to start with, and then consider the incentives to innovate when innovators do not anticipate a policy adjustment.
The conclusion from the literature that I regard as most important for the policy debate is that, if patents are perfectly enforceable, an emissions tax is more conducive to innovation than a carbon cap. With either a carbon cap or an emissions tax, energy producers must pay to emit pollutants. This is why producers are willing to license a technology that reduces emissions (in the replacement model) or reduces the cost of abatement (in the abatement model). But when the lower-emissions technology is widely di used, the allowance price falls, while an emissions tax would stay xed. The fall in the allowance price reduces the producers' willingness to pay for the license. It thus erodes licensing revenues, and erodes the incentive to innovate, as compared to the emissions tax. 1 This is explicit in the discussion of Fischer, Parry and Pizer (2003) , and implicit in Denicolo's analysis. I show it explicitly below using the replacement model, but interpret the result through a di erent lens.
In particular, I show that the innovator's licensing revenue can be characterized under both regulatory regimes as the size of the improvement (de ned as the percentage reduction in emissions per kilowatt hour) times the gross pro t earned in the energy market (gross of taxes or payments for allowances). The results alluded to above can therefore be explained by explaining what happens to gross pro ts in the energy market.
First consider an emissions tax and carbon cap that are optimal for the old technology, and are not adjusted to account for the new technology. Initially they support the same level of energy production and the same gross pro t in the energy market. However, this equivalence is broken once the new technology emerges. The two regulatory policies deliver di erent social bene ts from the innovation, which also has implications for pro t. With the emissions tax, energy production stays xed, while carbon emissions fall. With the carbon cap, carbon emissions stay xed, while energy production increases. Thus, gross pro t in the energy market stays xed under the emissions tax, but (typically) decreases under the carbon cap. According to the above characterization, the innovator's licensing revenue is smaller under the carbon cap than under the emissions tax.
Second, if each policy would be adjusted for static e ciency, then both policies support the same energy production with the new technology (the e cient level), and the same gross pro t in the energy market, leading to the same licensing revenues for the innovator.
The thrust of these arguments is that, unless there will be a quick and seamless adjustment to the regulatory policy after the cleaner technology is available, regulation through a carbon cap is less lucrative for innovators than regulation through an emissions tax. I add further to the defects of cap-and-trade regulation by showing that an innovator might not di use his innovation fully to the energy producers. The innovator has no incentive to invest in a larger improvement than he will use.
Although emissions taxes and carbon caps are two ways of making the bene ts of a carbon-reducing technology appropriable, there are many aspects of intellectual property law that may work against appropriability. Fischer, Parry and Pizer stress spillover bene ts to unlicensed energy producers. Not only does the proprietor lose the licensing revenue, but the spillover increases rivalry in the market. I do not address spillovers, because they merge into a complex set of questions about optimal enforcement and optimal patent breadth (see chapters 4 and 6 of Scotchmer(2004).) Su ce to say that appropriability has many challenges, including the nite length of intellectual property rights, unlicensed spillovers, limited patent breadth, and under a cap-and-trade system, the endogeneity of the allowance price.
Economists have a long history of studying price-versus-quantity regulation, although not with a focus on innovation. The focus has been on which instrument deals best with asymmetric information, rather than which instrument gives best incentives for innovation (see Kaplow and Shavell (2002) for a synopsis and critique). So far as I know, it is only in the context of energy that the comparison has focussed on innovation.
In sections 2, 3 and 4, I review and recast what is known about the relative virtues of carbon caps and emissions taxes when innovation is taken into account. In section 5, I show that the discrepancy in incentives can be substantial when the regulatory policy does not adjust. In section 6, I show that carbon caps have an additional defect. An innovation that could provide a large reduction in emissions will not be fully di used. The innovator will limit the expansion in energy supply in order to support the price of energy and the price of allowances, and overall pro t in the energy market. This implies that energy production will be divided between the clean and dirty technologies, so that carbon emissions are higher than necessary, conditional on the supply of energy. Further, the innovator's incentive to reduce emissions is truncated. The innovator has no incentive to improve the technology beyond the level that would be fully licensed.
Static E ciency: Balancing emissions and energy
Following Denicolo (1999) , I identify a technology with its emissions rate, and suppose that producing e kilowatt hours of energy emits ce units of carbon. That is, c is the carbon emissions rate.
Let e( ) be the demand for energy, such that e 0 < 0; and let p( ) be its inverse, the willingness to pay for energy. I assume that the revenue functions de ned by pe(p) and ep(e) are concave. For simplicity (and without loss of insight), I assume that the private cost of producing energy is zero, but that there is a social cost to releasing carbon, which I describe by a function k( ). It is natural to think of k( ) as an increasing convex function such that k(0) = 0: Then k 0 ( ) is the marginal social cost of releasing carbon.
In the absence of regulation, the competitive price of energy would be zero, since the marginal cost of production is zero. Denote the revenue-maximizing price by p m =p(e m ) where e m is the revenue-maximizing supply, e m = arg max ep(e) : Below, I say that aggregate supply, say e; is in the elastic part of the demand curve when e > e m : Analogously, I say that a price, say p; is in the elastic part of the demand curve when p < p m :
The social value of producing electricity is the consumers' surplus it provides, net of the social cost of emissions, namely S (E) k(cE) ; where
For each c; letÊ (c) be the optimizer of S (E) k(cE), that is, the e cient supply of energy. The optimizer satis es (1), and describes both the optimal supply of energy, which I will callÊ (c), and the optimal emissions, cÊ (c) :
There is clearly a tradeo between energy and carbon emissions. I use the term static e ciency for the optimal balance described by (1).
Proposition 2.1 [Static E ciency: A lower emissions rate should optimally lead to more energy production. Whether emissions should decrease depends on whether demand for energy is elastic at the optimal supply.] Suppose that c < c 0 :
is in the elastic part of the demand curve, then cÊ (c) < c 0Ê (c 0 ) : IfÊ (c) is in the inelastic part of the demand curve, then cÊ (c) > c 0Ê (c 0 ) : (1) is the rst order condition describing the maximum of S (E) k(cE) : The implicit function theorem together with the second order condition imply thatÊ 0 (c) < 0.
Multiplying (1) byÊ (c 0 ) at c 0 andÊ (c) at c; it follows that ifÊ (c 0 ) is in the elastic part of the demand curve,
IfÊ (c) is in the inelastic part of the demand curve,
Again because x ! xk 0 (x) is increasing with x; this shows that c 0Ê (c 0 ) < cÊ (c) :
Thus, if a carbon-reducing technology becomes available royalty-free to producers, some of the bene t should be taken as more energy, and if demand is elastic at the optimal supply, some of the bene t should be taken as lower carbon emissions.
Incentives when the regulatory policy is xed
In the remainder of the paper I assume there is a public domain technology for producing energy, which has emissions rate c 0 : I consider the incentive to introduce a new technology with a lower emissions rate, say c. It is useful to de ne the percentage reduction I assume the new technology will be proprietary, in the sense that it can be licensed for a royalty. I show that, whether the regulation is by an emissions tax or a carbon cap, the innovator's revenue is equal to the size of the improvement times the gross pro t earned in the energy market, at least when the innovation is fully di used, and energy production is in the elastic part of the demand curve.
My objective is to show how the proprietor's revenue depends on the regulatory policy, and to ascertain which policies create more revenue for innovators. Higher revenue means more incentive to invest. In this section I assume that the regulatory policy, either an emissions tax or a carbon cap, is xed.
Emissions Taxes
Let the emissions tax, , be given, and suppose a proprietary technology reduces the emissions rate from c 0 to c:
The proprietor licenses the lower-emissions technology at a royalty per kilowatt hour of energy. With the tax and royalty ( ; ) in place, the cost of producing a kilowatt hour of energy is c + ; and in a competitive market, this will be the price of energy. The proprietor will choose the royalty to solve max e ( c + )
subject to (c 0 c)
If the constraint (3) were not satis ed, the royalty would not attract energy producers. They would prefer the public domain technology with emissions rate c 0 : Proposition 3.1(a) below says that when the emissions tax is \not too high," the royalty on the lower-emissions technology will be chosen as the highest royalty that attracts the energy producers. This is where (3) holds as an equality. The supply of energy stays the same as before the innovation.
I regard Proposition 3.1(a) as the main case of interest, but the other case is also possible, so I include it for completeness. Proposition 3.1(b) says that, if the emissions tax is \high," and the reduction in emissions \substantial," the proprietor might set a royalty lower than the maximum that would still attract all the producers. A lower royalty can be pro table if the energy price would otherwise end up higher than the revenue-maximizing price p m . A lower royalty lowers the energy price and increases gross pro t in the energy market. Proposition 3.1(c) says that, when the e cient energy supply is in the elastic part of the demand curve, the proprietor's licensing revenue is a fraction An important consequence of the following proposition is that, unless the emissions tax is quite high, an emissions-reducing innovation will not increase the supply of energy. The bene ts of the new technology are taken entirely as a reduction in emissions.
A second important implication is that, when energy supply is in the elastic portion of the demand curve, the innovator's license revenue is equal to the size of the improvement times the gross pro t in the energy market (gross of the tax). 
Revenue can therefore be increased by reducing : By continuity, this is also true for c close to zero.
(c) follows because, when the royalty is (c 0 c) ; the price is c 0 ; so total revenue is
In gure 1, I have assumed that the tax is optimal, and that k 0 is constant, so that c 0 =p Ê (c 0 ) and c = p Ê (c) : Implicitly, =k 0 : Figure 1 shows the the case described in Proposition 3.1(a), where the optimal supply of energy is in the elastic part of the demand curve. The proprietor collects the shaded horizontal area in gure 1 for the duration of the property right. This area is a fraction of gross pro t in the energy market. Figure 1 shows that the supply of energy stays the same after the emissions rate is lowered, while total emissions decline. The supply of energy should optimally rise toÊ (c) ; but that does not happen because of the royalty. 
Cap and Trade
Let C be an arbitrary carbon cap. This is the number of allowances that are allocated to owners, who are assumed to be widely dispersed and to behave as price takers. When the emissions rate falls from c 0 to c, the energy supply that is feasible under the cap increases from C=c 0 to C=c. If the innovation is fully di used, the price of energy falls from from p(C=c 0 ) to p(C=c) :
The carbon cap C cannot be optimal for both the original emissions rate c 0 and the lower emissions rate c: If C is optimal for c 0 ; then by Proposition 2.1, the optimal carbon cap for c is smaller, provided that demand is elastic at that level of production.
If the proprietor licenses energy production in amount e > 0; the total supply of energy under the carbon cap C is given by E (e; c) ; de ned as
To be in compliance with the carbon cap, 0 e C c ; which implies that
Given a royalty rate ; letê ( ) 2 0; C c represent the demand for licenses, measured in kilowatt hours, and let q ( ) be the allowance price per ton of released carbon. The demand for energy and the allowance price satisfy the following in equilibrium. 
If the revenue-maximizing royalty leads to full di usion,ê ( ) = C c ; we can write these equilibrium conditions as
The lefthand sides of (8) and (9) cannot be positive because energy producers would expand production in response to positive pro t. The equality (8) holds because the proprietor has positive market share; hence pro t cannot be negative.
No producers are using the old technology, so the lefthand side of (9) could conceivably be negative. However, the proprietor's revenue-maximizing choice of will force an equality in (9) . If the pro tability of the old technology is negative, the pro tability remains negative even if the proprietor raises a bit, say to + ". The proprietor's revenue is then ( + ") (C=c) instead of (C=c) : The increase in will be balanced by a reduction in the allowance price q ( ) ; such that the equality (8) holds at the energy price p(C=c) : The price of energy cannot rise (fall) because there would be an over-(under-) supply of allowances.
The equilibrium conditions (8) and (9) determine the proprietor's optimal royalty for the cap-and-trade policy, assuming full di usion (ê ( ) = C c ):
The following proposition summarizes the implications of this equilibrium, and in particular, says that the licensing revenue is again a fraction of gross pro t in in the energy market (before paying for allowances). The fraction is again the size of the improvement, 
The innovator's revenue is shown as the lightly shaded rectangle in gure 2, which is a fraction Thus, the social bene ts of a proprietary emissions-reducing innovation will be taken di erently under the two regulatory systems. With an emissions tax, the bene ts will be taken at least partly (and maybe completely) as a reduction in carbon emissions. With a cap-and-trade system, the bene ts will be taken as more energy, but carbon emissions are xed by the cap. Neither outcome is optimal. As shown in Proposition 2.1, it is e cient to realize the bene ts of a carbon-reducing technology as both an increase in energy production and a decrease (increase) in carbon emissions, according to whether production is in the elastic (inelastic) part of the demand curve.
So far I have made no assumption about the regulatory policies except that they are xed. I will now describe e cient regulatory policies, and consider how the incentives to innovate are di erent if the policies are optimal for the public-domain technology.
Given an emissions rate c; say that the tax c is e cient for emissions rate c if it satis es (12), whereÊ (c) is the optimal energy supply described by (1) .
Given an emissions rate c; say that the carbon cap C c is e cient for emissions rate c if it satis es (13), whereÊ (c) is the optimal energy supply described by (1) .
The tax described by (12) is only optimal if the producers can use the technology without paying a royalty. Thus, (12) is more appropriately described as the royalty-free e cient tax.
The following proposition says that proprietor earns more licensing revenue with an e cient emissions tax than with the e cient carbon cap. This follows from two facts that I previously established: (1) With both forms of regulation, the proprietor's licensing revenue is the size of the improvement, ; times the gross pro t collected in the energy market. (2) The gross pro t collected in the energy market is lower with a carbon cap than with the emissions tax, because the supply of energy expands under the carbon cap, and because (by assumption) production is in the elastic portion of the demand curve. Proposition 3.3 (The incentive to innovate is greater under a xed, e cient emissions tax than under a xed, e cient carbon cap.) Let c 0 be the emissions rate of a public-domain technology, and let c be the lower emissions rate of a proprietary technology. Let the tax Proof : The rst two equalities below use the optimality of the tax rate and the carbon cap. The inequality follows from the fact that E (c 0 ) is in the elastic portion of the demand curve, which implies p
This proves the result.
Adjustments for Static E ciency
Because the proprietor's revenue is a given fraction of the gross pro t earned in the energy market under both regulatory regimes, the proprietor's revenue in the two regimes can be compared by comparing the gross pro t earned in the energy market. In the previous section, this led us to the conclusion that an emissions tax is more lucrative for the innovator than a carbon cap, provided both support the same production of energy before the innovation.
By the same reasoning, an e cient tightening of the carbon cap should increase the proprietor's licensing revenue, whereas an e cient reduction in the emissions tax should decrease the proprietor's licensing revenue. This assumes that tightening the cap increases gross pro t, while reducing the tax increases supply and increases gross pro t in the energy market. I now show this.
With an emissions tax, one of the complications is that the initial technology is assumed nonproprietary, while the new technology is proprietary. The tax c de ned by (12) is only optimal if there is no royalty. If the new technology is proprietary, the tax should be lower than if the technology is in the public domain, because energy producers pay a royalty in addition to the tax. 2 If the tax were equal to the social cost of emissions, the tax plus royalty would be ine ciently high, and energy consumption would be ine ciently low. To achieve the optimal production of energy, the tax t and the royalty together must equal the marginal social cost of carbon emissions:
I now show that the following, also derived by Denicolo (1999) , is the optimal emissions tax when producers also pay a royalty. Hence (1) is satis ed.
The next proposition says that the proprietor makes less revenue if the emissions tax is reduced to achieve static e ciency. Proposition 4.1 (Adjusting the emissions tax to achieve static e ciency decreases the proprietor's licensing revenue, whereas adjusting the carbon cap to achieve static e ciency increases the proprietor's revenue) Let c 0 be the emissions rate of a public-domain technology, and let c be the lower emissions rate of a proprietary technology. Suppose thatÊ (c 0 ) is in the elastic part of the demand curve. (a) Let the tax 0 be e cient for c 0 ; and let t c;c 0 satisfy (15). The proprietor makes less licensing revenue when the emissions tax is t c;c 0 than when it is 0 : (b) Let C c be the e cient cap for c; and let C 0 be the e cient cap for c 0 : Then licensing revenue is higher under the cap C c than under the cap C 0 :
Proof : (a) Using Proposition 3.1(a), the prices of energy without a tax adjustment and with a tax adjustment are, respectively,
Using Proposition 3.1(c), and the fact thatÊ (c 0 ) <Ê (c) ; the result follows because
and both are in the elastic part of the demand curve,
Using Proposition 3.2, the result follows.
Proposition 4.1 is illustrated in gure 3 and 4, using the assumption that k 0 is constant. This implies that 0 =k 0 is the optimal royalty-free emissions tax before and after the reduction in emissions. The price of energy that supports optimal consumption is 0 c 0 when only the public domain technology is available, and is 0 c when the lower-carbon technology is available. The licensing revenue with a xed emissions tax is the higher rectangle in gure 3 with dotted lines around it, and the licensing revenue after the adjustment is the lower shaded rectangle, which is smaller. Both areas are a fraction c 0 c c 0 of gross pro t in the energy market. Because energy supply increases with the cleaner technology and lower tax, gross pro t in the energy market is reduced, hence licensing revenue is reduced.
The licensing revenues under the cap-and-trade regime are shown in gure 4. Licensing revenue with the xed cap is the lower shaded rectangle, with energy supply C 0 =c: If the cap is reduced to C c ; as is e cient, licensing revenue is the larger rectangle slightly to the left and above, with the e cient energy supply C c =c: Again, both areas are a fraction Cc /c energy demand
Figure 4: Licensing revenue is higher if the carbon cap is reduced for static e ciency Finally, the following proposition, which is proved by Denicolo (1999) , follows immediately from my characterization of the innovator's licensing revenue as a xed fraction of gross pro t in the energy market. The e ciency adjustments ensure that the gross pro t earned in the energy market is the same under both regimes, because both support the same energy output. Proposition 4.2 (If there will be an optimal dynamic adjustment in the regulatory policy, emissions taxes and carbon caps create the same incentives to innovate.) Let c 0 be the emissions rate of a public-domain technology, and let c be the lower emissions rate of a
Comparing Incentives
Assuming linear demand, I now show that the divergence in licensing revenues can be signi cant.
Suppose that the marginal social cost of emissions is k 0 = 1; and that demand for energy is given by p(e) = 2 e: Then for each emissions rate c; the optimal emissions tax is c, the optimal energy production isÊ (c) = 2 c; and the optimal carbon cap is C c = c (2 c) : Let the initial emissions rate be c 0 = 1, hence C 0 = 1:
Suppose that a proprietor achieves a new technology with emissions rate c < c 0 : Using (4), when energy producers must pay the tax 0 = 1, the proprietor's most pro table royalty satis es EM = (c 0 c) = 1 c:
With the tax 0 = 1 and royalty EM ; the price of energy is the same as before the innovation, p With the initially optimal carbon cap, C 0 = 1; the proprietor's most pro table royalty, C ; satis es (10) , and will determine the equilibrium price of energy and the equilibrium allowance price. As a function of an arbitrary cap C and the old and new emissions rates (c 0 ; c) ; these satisfy p From the expression q =
; a reduction in carbon emissions reduces the price of energy and reduces the price of allowances.
The middle line in gure 5 graphs the proprietor's licensing revenue if the policy (either the tax or the carbon cap) is adjusted for static e ciency using the new technology. These are the same, by Proposition 4.2. The graph shows that the licensing revenue can be much lower with the carbon cap than with an emissions tax when the carbon reduction is large (the left side of the graph). For smaller improvements (toward the right), the discrepancy vanishes. The graph also shows that, in the tax regime, the proprietor's revenue falls if the emissions tax is adjusted for static e ciency, but in the cap-and-trade regime, the proprietor's revenue rises with the analogous adjustment.
The Di usion Problem
The analysis above assumes that the clean technology will be fully di used to energy producers. The assumption is valid in the case of an emissions tax, but I show here that it might not be valid in the case of a carbon cap. If the improvement is large, the innovator will limit di usion in order to mitigate price erosion in the energy market and in the market for allowances. Some of the market will be supplied by the old higher-emissions technology. This is the type of exclusion on use that we usually expect from proprietary pricing. Here it has two important implications. First, electricity production is smaller than it could be, conditional on the carbon emissions, and second, it undermines the incentive to invest in large carbon reductions.
The following lemma describes a restriction on the royalty rates that could possibly be optimal for the proprietor. 
Proof : (a) If the royalty is smaller than the lower bound, then, using (6) and (7),
All producers use the lower-emissions technology and make zero pro t, but they would make strictly negative pro t using the old technology. Then the proprietor can increase its royalty without losing market share. This cannot be an equilibrium.
If the royalty is larger than the upper bound, then p(C=c 0 ) cq ( ) < (c=c 0 ) (p (C=c 0 ) c 0q ( )) : All producers use the old technology, and the proprietor has no licensees. The proprietor can increase pro t by reducing so that the new technology is competitive with the old technology.
(b) There are two cases, thatê ( ) = C=c andê ( ) < C=c: In the rst case, 0 =p(C=c) cq ( ) p(C=c) c 0q ( ) ; which implies the inequality (18). In the second case, 0 =p(C=c) cq ( ) = p(C=c) c 0q ( ), which implies equality.
For royalty rates in the interior of (17), the condition (18) holds as an equality, and establishes a one-to-one relationship between and the demand for electricity,ê ( ) : For royalty rates in the interior of (17), there is a monotonic relationship between the royalty rate , the number of kilowatt hours produced under license,ê ( ) ; the total supply of electricity, E (ê ( ) ; c) ; and the innovator's contribution to it, which I shall call s: The proprietor's optimization problem can be phrased in terms of any of these four variables.
In terms of the royalty rate, the innovator's per-period revenue is ê ( ). Using (18) as an equality, the revenue can be written as the following on the interior of (17).
Taking e as the choice variable instead of ; the revenue can be written
Using (5), the total supply of electricity can be written
e. Written as a function of the innovator's contribution, s, the revenue iŝ
Let s (c) be the optimizer ofR:
We have the following conclusion: Example: Suppose the demand price is given by a linear function, p(E) = a bE: Then
The new technology is fully di used if and only if
For a high enough royalty rate, (18) shows that electricity producers will not be fully licensed. Increasing the royalty rate will cause the price of electricity to rise. This is because the higher royalty rate reduces the number of licensees, which reduces electricity supply. At the same time, according to (7), the price of allowances rises. The higher price of allowances ampli es the producers' willingness to pay for licenses. It is largely due to this feedback e ect that the innovator with a large improvement (low emissions rate c) will not license all producers. Instead he will nd it valuable to license only some of the producers, in order to maintain a high price for allowances, and to maintain a high willingness to pay for his lower-emissions technology.
The innovator can avoid pro t erosion either by witholding the new technology from some of the market, or by avoiding large advances in the rst place. Proposition 6.1 says that, if an innovation entails a large reduction in emissions, the innovator will use the rst strategy. He will license only part of the market. But then it would have been wasteful to invest in a large advance.
I interpret this as another reason that cap and trade is less conducive to innovation than an emissions tax.
Conclusion
Any regulatory policy that imposes nancial burdens for emitting carbon will also create an incentive to invest in carbon-reducing technologies. Emissions taxes and carbon caps are two such policies. While these two policies can be made equivalent from the static point of view of managing the tradeo between energy production and carbon emissions, they are not equivalent from the point of view of encouraging innovation.
Because a solution to global warming will likely require a change in technologies, I have focussed on the replacement model of Denicolo (1999) rather than on the abatement model. I have characterized the licensing revenue of the innovator as the size of the innovator's improvement times the gross pro t collected in the energy market. (Of course, because the producers are assumed to be perfectly competitive, they will earn zero pro t once they pay the emissions tax or the allowances price.) This characterization of the innovator's licensing revenue holds whether the regulatory mechanism is an emissions tax or a carbon cap. It explains why the two policies are equivalent for innovation when the regulatory mechanism of either type would be adjusted ex post for e ciency, using the cleaner technology. Both regulatory policies would then lead to the same energy supply, to the same price of energy, and to the same gross pro t in the energy market.
It also explains why the licensing revenues are higher with the emissions tax than with a carbon cap, when both policies are equivalent to begin with. Energy supply expands under the carbon cap, but not under the emissions tax, and this reduces gross pro t in the energy market. Another way to express the revenue disadvantage of the carbon cap is through the endogeneity of the allowance price. I showed in section 5 that the price e ect, and therefore the revenue discrepancy, can be signi cant.
One way to mitigate the price e ect is to unify the markets for carbon emissions. If uni ed, the demand for carbon allowances comes from many sectors, not all of which use the new, proprietary technology. For this reason, there may be less reduction in the allowance price. This helps to restore the incentive to innovate, but also means that there is a smaller expansion in the consumption of energy, due to the fact that the price reduction in the energy market is also dampened.
The choice between emissions taxes and carbon caps has aspects not addressed in this paper. These are nicely laid out by Parry and Pizer (2007) , pointing out, for example, how the policies compare in terms of the uncertainty they create for producers, their political viability, and the revenue consequences for the government.
